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Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexandre SheldonDuplaix. Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold
War Naval Espionage. New York: Wiley, 2009.
414pp. $30

Contrary to the popular notions of spying as conveyed in novels and films, espionage is a difficult and frequently
dangerous business. Although everyone
does it, some nations are just better at
it. In this work, Peter A. Huchthausen
and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix offer a
series of accounts of naval espionage
after World War II.
While this reviewer cannot attest to the
bona fides of Sheldon-Duplaix, I do
know that Huchthausen was the consummate insider in naval intelligence,
having had a diverse career during
which he always seemed to be in the
middle of the action. His specialty was
in human-source intelligence, with a
primary focus on the Soviet Union and
its navy. Sadly, Peter died in July 2008,
before the formal release of this book,
so it seems somewhat unfair to critique
his work.
To be of value to other than casual
readers, a book on Cold War naval espionage should first describe the national
security context to explain why these
intelligence activities were undertaken
in the first place and what bits of
knowledge were so important that they
required such great risk. Second, it
should ask, what did naval espionage do
to obtain the information, and what
contributions did naval intelligence offer to the problem? What did naval
intelligence add to the body of knowledge? Against this paradigm, Hide and
Seek falls short of the mark.

The early chapters provide an interesting account of the competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union
to obtain German technology immediately after World War II. The authors
go on to discuss the early stages of the
Cold War, culminating with the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962. Although there
are numerous references to archival historical material, books, and personal
correspondence, Huchthausen and
Sheldon-Duplaix largely rely on anecdotes (we call them “sea stories” in the
Navy), loosely strung together, and offer few conclusions. For example, one is
left wondering why the Royal Navy
would risk the life of the World War II
hero, frogman, and MI6 diver Lionel
Crabb in a seemingly failed effort to
conduct underhull reconnaissance of an
aging Soviet warship.
While some insights are provided into
naval intelligence activities during the
Cold War, especially the Cuban missile
crisis, no description is offered of the
enormous contributions of naval intelligence and its operations to the redefinition of the U.S. Navy’s maritime
strategy in the 1980s, which focused on
holding at risk the Soviet ballisticmissile submarine force.
Extensively covered is Project JENNIFER,
the joint CIA-Navy venture to recover
the lost Soviet Golf II ballistic-missile
submarine from the depths of the
northern Pacific Ocean in 1974. The
authors’ unique contribution is a
lengthy description of the efforts taken
by the United States to provide the lost
Soviet submariners dignified burials at
sea when the submarine was recovered—an event that was videotaped and
years later handed over to the Russians.
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Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix also
examine a number of counterintelligence issues, such as the 1961 Christine
Keeler affair in Britain and, more important, the treason of John Walker,
who spied for the Soviets from 1967 to
the mid-1980s and whom the authors
describe as “one of the greatest espionage successes in history.”
Two concluding chapters introduce orthogonal themes, such as the 1980s Soviet operations that culminated in the
“Whiskey on the Rocks” (a euphemism
for the grounding of a Soviet submarine
in Swedish territorial waters) and a bizarre account of how UFOs might have
altered the strategic balance during the
Cold War.
Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix offer an interesting and entertaining read,
one that shows that U.S. naval attachés
at times work in difficult and dangerous
circumstances. However, because of its
excessive use of anecdotes, this book
does not add much to the body of
knowledge about naval espionage—neither that of the United States, of the Soviets, or of anyone else.
JEROME J. BURKE

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Washington, D.C.

Rhys-Jones, Graham. Churchill and the Norway
Campaign. South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and
Sword, 2008. 223pp. $33

“The principle of aiming everything at
the enemy’s center of gravity admits of
only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally
rewarding.” This classic dictum, given
to us by the great military theorist Carl
von Clausewitz, provides the impetus
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behind this book. Originally conceived
as a case study for inclusion in the
Strategy and Policy curriculum at the
U.S. Naval War College, this historical
work covers the operations in Norway
during the spring of 1940, one of the
most overlooked campaigns of the Second World War. The reader is presented with a complete account, in a
fast-moving and easy format, of the
strategic decision making that eventually led both Great Britain and France,
on the one side, and Germany, on the
other, to conclude that opening a new
theater in Norway could in fact be
“exceptionally rewarding.”
While Churchill figures prominently in
the book’s title, the reader will find examined not only his policy decisions
and strategic ideas discussed at length
but also the actions and decisions of
numerous other participants in the governments of the major belligerents.
Most studies concerning the war in the
West in 1940 focus on the French military’s epic defeat, but Rhys-Jones offers
an account of French participation in
the war as Great Britain’s strategic partner. The strategic partnership between
the Neville Chamberlain and Édouard
Daladier governments in the spring of
1940 is a subject that usually does not
get much attention, but an interesting
account of that short-lived alliance can
be found in this book.
Rhys-Jones, a former member of the
Naval War College faculty, presents his
analysis in a manner that both students
and faculty at the college will find familiar. He begins at the policy level, focusing on the benefits and drawbacks
that each major participant concludes
are relevant to undertaking operations
in what was considered a secondary theater. He then outlines each belligerent’s
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